

**Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict Assessment:
Substantive Findings of the June 24-26, 2008
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) Application Workshop
July 9, 2008**

Disclaimer: This report has not been cleared by any of the agencies involved in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (the Team), although individuals who participated in the Team have reviewed and commented on this draft. Susan Allen Nan, an outside observer of the deliberations of the Team, wrote this report to summarize the Team's conclusions. The author accepts full responsibility for any errors in her attempt to convey the views of the assessment Team. As this report contains a summary of the Team's discussions, facts cited here have not necessarily been checked against other sources, but reflect the informed assertions of country experts within the Team.

Executive Summary

The DRC is an extremely complex operating environment with a wide range of challenges to peace and development. There is an absence of basic infrastructure and reliable communication in the vast majority of the country. A culture of systemic corruption, patron-client systems and chronically weak institutions enables destabilizing "winner take all" outcomes across sectors. Given its large quantities of valuable natural resources and strategic location bordering nine countries, stability in the DRC is critical for stability in the region. The valuable resources in the DRC remain both a motivation for conflict and a means by which conflict is waged. With this context in mind, the Team assessed conflict in the DRC and offers the following priority areas for consideration in the upcoming Country Assistance Strategy for the DRC particularly, and the whole of government engagement in the DRC more generally.

Conflicts in the DRC exist on three primary levels:

- Potential violent conflict simmering throughout the Congo (e.g. Bas Congo)
- The post-conflict areas that have emerged from active violent conflict but are vulnerable to an immediate return to violence (e.g. Ituri)
- The "hot spots" of active violent conflict (e.g. North Kivu)

Strategic Priorities for USG engagement in DRC are:

- Ensure sensitivity to conflict dynamics at all three levels of conflict in all USG efforts throughout country
- Address critical threats to stability of insecurity and impunity
- Bolster indigenous sources of social and institutional resilience

The next two and a half years are a critical period in which the government and new Constitution must prove an ability to effectively provide for the people of the DRC prior to the 2011 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Thus, assistance in this window of opportunity is essential in order ward off widespread dissatisfaction if core grievances of poor governance, insecurity, impunity, lack of access to livelihoods, gender discrimination, human rights abuses and inequality are not addressed.

Introduction

The Team assessed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as an extremely complex country with a wide range of challenges to peace and development. Given its large quantities of valuable natural resources and strategic location bordering nine countries, stability in the DRC is critical for stability in the region. As current conditions do not support stability in the DRC, the assessment suggests concerted international support for peace and development is essential not only for the people of the Congo, but also for those neighbors affected by it.

The DRC's history of Belgian colonial rule, Mobutu's authoritarian regime, and the more recent and current Kabila presidencies, can all be seen in the current challenges facing the DRC. A culture of systemic corruption, patron-client systems, and chronically weak institutions, enable destabilizing "winner take all" outcomes across sectors.

Conflict in the DRC is not simple. With its geographical location and porous borders, the DRC is touched by much of the conflict in Africa. The valuable resources in the DRC remain both a motivation for conflict and a means by which conflict is waged. The fighting in north Kivu can be seen as both a harbinger of what may lie in the future of the rest of Congo if grievances are not addressed, and as an area of remaining active conflict that demands particular conflict resolution interventions in a country where other areas have reached settlements.

Given the complexity of conflict in the DRC, the Team found it useful to consider three types of conflict of concern in the Congo:

- Potential violent conflict simmering throughout the Congo (e.g. Bas Congo)
- The post-conflict areas that have emerged from active violent conflict but are vulnerable to an immediate return to violence (e.g. Ituri)
- The "hot spots" of active violent conflict (e.g. North Kivu)

This report presents the Team's assessment of the context for each of these three types of conflict in the DRC. The analysis begins by presenting the core grievances which are the fuel of conflict there, followed by the social and institutional resilience which dampen conflict. Next, the analysis summarizes the key actors that can either mobilize grievances to drive conflict or can harness social and institutional resilience to mitigate conflict, and describes these drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. Finally, the report concludes with an assessment of opportunities for engagement in the DRC, the Team's conclusions on priority areas for engagement, and a warning of the potential consequences of a failure to act to address all three levels of conflict in the DRC.

Context

The Team noted that describing the context of the DRC in any summary way is difficult because of the diversity within the large country. The DRC is home to almost 70 million

people that represent 200 distinct ethnic groups living on land roughly as large as the part of the United States that lies East of the Mississippi River. The capital city of Kinshasa, far in the West, is connected to the East only by air travel. Even where roads exist, trucks take weeks to travel between major cities. Despite the separation between areas of the country, there are some key contextual factors that are relevant to conflict throughout the DRC. The most important of these are: lack of infrastructure, lack of communication, valuable natural resources, neighboring conflicts, chronically weak institutions, and a culture of systemic corruption, patron-client systems, and indigenoussness.

The absence of basic infrastructure and reliable communication in the vast majority of the country has meant that local conflicts cannot easily spread to neighboring regions. However, rebel groups can elude government detection by hiding in the bush. In fact, porous borders and vast areas of the bush far beyond government control make the DRC an attractive location for armed groups. Furthermore, since finding reputable sources of information presents a great challenge, rumors and misinformation campaigns can be forceful in enflaming conflict. Given the extreme lack of infrastructure and communication, the Team felt it is important to note the roles this context plays in shaping the means of conflict. If a bridge were built between communities that have previously had very little contact, that bridge, while representing important progress in building infrastructure, would enable all sorts of contact between the two communities it connects. Some of that contact might take the form of violent conflict. Other contact might spread HIV. While the Team was clear that the potential spread of HIV or the potential outbreak of violent conflict are not reasons to avoid building any roads, all infrastructure improvement efforts should be carefully designed to mitigate against unintended harmful effects.

The DRC's geography is highly relevant to the conflict there. The DRC's valuable natural resources serve to support the livelihoods of artisanal miners and others who manage to support their families in the extractive industries. However, neighboring groups, including armed groups, also are interested in these resources and easily remove them from the DRC illegally. To the extent that armed groups involve themselves in resource extraction, these resources support the armed groups' continued survival and ability to fight. However, these resources also represent a potential wealth that could support the DRC's transition to a stable peace. A transition to a stable peace is hampered by the conflicts in neighboring countries that continue to impact the DRC.

Finally, a culture of systemic corruption, patron-client systems, indigenoussness and chronically weak institutions, supports a tradition of individuals exploiting opportunities for individual gain, patrons and clients working to further their own groups' interests, ethnic groups protecting perceived rights against others "foreign" to their ancestral territory, and little national institutional strength to advocate for the common good. Leaders generally lack accountability to a constituency, except perhaps through the traditional patron-client system that favors ethnic groups. Individuals exploit others with impunity. Ethnic groups quickly suspect other ethnic groups of trying to seize their land or rights to natural resources. Erratically paid and poorly trained soldiers and policemen use predatory practices to feed themselves and provide for their families.

In short, the DRC is a context in which it seems difficult to get anything done, yet somehow people mostly manage to survive, to make do or “*se débrouiller*.”

Core Grievances

Core Grievances and Social and Institutional Resilience, as defined in the ICAF, are the output of Step 1 of the analysis. The core grievances describe a group or groups’ perception “that their needs for physical or livelihood security, interests or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions.” As the presentation above of the context of the DRC foreshadows, there are many widespread grievances relevant to current and potential future conflicts. These grievances are intertwined and mutually aggravating factors that upset segments of the population.

Impunity

Within the widespread and deeply entrenched culture of impunity, individuals are not held accountable for their actions. Leaders are not held accountable to a constituency. Corruption is rampant and is considered “business as usual” in most sectors. There is a lack of a functioning justice system to resolve issues over land ownership, water rights, cattle, gender-based violence, or plundering by armed groups, military, or police. Many people feel a sense of injustice connected with the culture of impunity.

Insecurity

The people of the DRC live with great insecurity. The military and other armed groups constantly threaten civilians through both gender-based violence and plundering the livelihoods of the civilian population. The presence of foreign forces increases the number of armed groups preying on the civilian population and exacerbates this insecurity. Unclear land tenure and natural resource concession rights leave people insecure in their livelihoods. People are both physically and economically insecure. In this environment of insecurity, perceived threats can quickly trigger violent responses, often against another ethnic group.

Gender-Based Violence and Discrimination

Women in the DRC face widespread brutal and debilitating physical gender-based violence and social and legal restrictions on their rights. Women are endangered by men who use rape as a tactic of war, domestic violence, and any of the many men who rape in a culture where rapists are rarely penalized and sexual abuse of women is the worst in the world. A married woman cannot even enter a courtroom without her husband’s permission. Women’s disempowerment in the DRC even goes to the extreme that the many women who have been raped or brutalized by an armed group have no recourse to justice. Women express despair that no one seems to care if they are raped, and report a general loss of trust in men.

Inequality

Regions in the DRC vary remarkably in their access to resources, provision of social services, and attention from the international community. Within regions, too, villages vary as well in the degree to which basic human needs are met. Some areas of the DRC have not seen foreign donors or their implementing NGO partners in years. Meanwhile, substantial attention continues to be directed at North and South Kivu. People in the DRC suffering from unmet basic needs who learn of better programming in other regions perceive an unjust inequality. There is a perception in the DRC that all should have equal access to a peace dividend, but few are seeing any peace dividend.

Poor Governance

People in the DRC perceive poor governance in three interrelated ways: poor services, corruption, and ineffective governance.

First, the government fails to provide basic social services. Most of the people in the DRC who receive services receive them from churches or NGOs. Many people fend for themselves without access to basic government services. In a country where even the legal military and police prey off the population, people see little if any benefit from the government.

Corruption, winner take all attitudes, and lack of any political space for the opposition create a system in which people perceive the governmental officials as taking all they can get for themselves. High-level governmental officials are assumed to be trying to get all they can (in terms of accumulating wealth and power) while they remain in office. Leaders are not held accountable to any expectation that they will work for the greater good of the population as a whole. *Fonctionnaires* (civil servants) are often frustrated with their corrupt bosses who make it hard for an honest civil servant to accomplish basic duties. Opposition politicians find little if any room to influence the country's governance.

Finally, the governance of the country by the government is simply ineffective in numerous ways and often entirely absent. Nationally, extreme executive interference undercuts the efficacy of other government structures, and even of professional efforts within the executive branch. The judges and lawyers are few in number and poorly trained to work with laws often contradictory to rights provided in the constitution. Prisons are "easy to escape", overcrowded, under-funded, places of human rights abuse, and subject to large riots. Locally, provincial governments are caught in a bind that leaves them cash-strapped. On the one hand, they are unable to effectively capture taxes from the extractive industries. On the other hand, they see the central government failing to enact the promised 60% - 40% revenue sharing deal (particularly in Katanga and Bas Congo). This dynamic leads to non-performance and paralysis of the new decentralized governance structures.

Lack of Access to Livelihoods

Virtually every individual living in DRC sees some threat to their access to livelihoods. The urban population sees a lack of economic opportunity. The rural population sees a

lack of access to markets for their crops. The business elite sees a bad business climate, limited credit market, and shifting regulations subject to the corrupt system. All Congolese see their livelihoods subject to the vicissitudes of actual or threatened violent conflict. The active fighting currently in the Kivus restricts the ability of individuals to provide for their families, and of small and medium sized enterprises and merchants to engage in exchange of goods and services. Insecure land tenure and property and natural resource rights impose additional insecurity on the livelihoods of many. In short, most Congolese feel their livelihoods tenuous and threatened from many directions.

Human Rights

Some local actors, particularly NGOs and children's rights groups, international NGOs, the UN, and the ICRC share concern not only for the human rights issues highlighted above in regards to gender based violence and discrimination, but also other human rights concerns. There is no generally accepted human rights road map or coordinated coherent approach to human rights, and the expected UN independent human rights advisor for eastern Congo has not been appointed. Thousands of child soldiers remain in the government and rebel forces, demobilization efforts are weak, and children (ex-child soldiers) remain in prison on death penalty charges against international law. The victims, their families, and local and international observers of human rights in the DRC find numerous grievances.

Social and Institutional Resilience

As defined in the ICAF, sources of social and institutional resilience are a group or groups' perception "that social relationships, structures or processes are in place and able to provide opportunities for resolving conflicts and meeting basic needs through non-violent means." The many sources of social and institutional resilience identified in the DRC relate to the following categories of resiliencies: *se debrouiller*, patience, identity, and strong potential.

As the Team discussed resilience in the DRC, *se debrouiller* (making do) emerged as a key category of resilience that overlaps with many other categories. People have learned how to survive by any means in the context of lack of state services and constant threats to their physical and livelihood security. People in the DRC show strong self-reliance and also access strong kinship networks and patron-client relationships. While this drive to survive may include the formation of local armed groups such as Mai-Mai, or other resort to violent means in desperate attempts to provide one's family with food and safety, often the tradition of making do fosters creative solutions to seemingly impossible challenges. The creative solutions that allow people to make do may not, however, be sustainable.

One workshop participant described a vignette that captures the potentially explosive fragility of some of the ways people make do locally. In Spring 2008, a USG specialist found himself in a taxi that had to stop for gas. The taxi driver, with cigarette hanging from his mouth, proceeded to pump gas into a large plastic bin in the trunk. He explained

that the regular gas tank that had come with the car had broken, and he was making do as so many other drivers make do. (He did agree to put out his cigarette until the gas transfer was complete.) While the plastic bin did work as a temporary measure to keep the driver on the road and collecting income, and similar measures worked for other drivers, the jostling plastic bin could ignite in the smallest of fender benders.

Similarly, other means of coaxing function out of dis-function may feed long-term challenges with short-term solutions, or may solve one problem while creating another. For example, unemployed physicians provide services based on user fees, allowing the wealthy to access medical care, but leaving the poor without access. The international NGOs and churches that currently provide most services in the DRC may leave when their priorities or funding shifts, leaving a lack of governmental capacity to fill the gaps created by their departure. MONUC's stabilizing efforts are not matched by the government and MONUC's departure will likely leave a large gap in stability support. The resilience of strong kinship ties and patronage system that provide for those who find themselves within a group with ample resources works only for as long as that group has enough resources. When the kinship group or patron-client team loses resources, that system no longer works and there is no functioning national social service system to fall back upon. When Congolese soldiers get resources from the population to provide for their families' survival, that solves the soldiers' problem while creating a wider problem of lack of security for other civilians.

Another major category of social resilience within the DRC involves patience. The Congolese seem to want the transition from conflict to peace to be successful, and are willing to give it some time to show results. Peoples' expectations within the DRC for government functioning are very low compared to western standards, including low expectations for human rights, civil servant functions, and the judicial sector. Even with health and education, which are highly valued in the DRC, people demonstrate patience by allowing a few more years for the transition to work and begin showing results through improvement in these areas. The people's patience provides a cushion that protects the government for the first few years of the transition from revolution based on grievances with the government. This patience, of course, is not infinite.

The Team also identified the desire by individuals and groups to be identified as Congolese as a category of resilience. Identity groups, whether based on ethnicity or gender or occupation or region, all seem to want to *belong* to the overall Congolese identity. This claiming of Congolese national identity by a large number of disparate individuals and groups can be construed as a national pride that has survived war, poverty, and dictatorship. Diverse people and groups also gather around a shared enjoyment of music and religious activities; they contribute to and strengthen the sense of a shared national identity.

Finally, the interagency assessment team identified the potential for economic development of DRC, based on the rich natural resources, as a very strong potential category of resilience. Some private companies are now investing in Corporate Social Responsibility programs, and more may do so as the advantages become clearer.

Programs in community policing to protect the population show promise of increasing security. The Congolese Diaspora, with its high level of education and wide experience, may be mobilized to engage more with the DRC as the transition solidifies. The government and international community seem to be paying more attention to gender based violence, and the role of women in social resilience may be further strengthened as their human rights are honored.

The Team expressed much admiration for the people of the DRC, particularly their abilities to be so resilient in the face of the challenges presented by their history, geography, and lack of infrastructure. It is the people of the DRC that are the real hope for the future of the country.

Key Actors

The Team identified key actors in the DRC who can shape social patterns and institutional performance, mobilize people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience, or provide means to support other key actors. The primary groups of key actors are formal governmental actors (the president, four vice presidents, ministers, local ministers, army, police, judiciary, national assembly and provincial assemblies, and *fonctionnaires*), rebel groups (Nkunda and FDLR), international actors (including international companies, China, Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, the UN, Belgium the U.S., and other donors), and a variety of civil society actors. Each of these types of actors plays roles in either drivers of conflict or mitigating factors, discussed below. A more detailed worksheet listing specific key actors, their motivations, and means appears in the workshop notes in Appendix 2.

Drivers of Conflict

Key actors may mobilize groups around the potential of grievances to unleash violent conflict. The Team identified the following existent drivers of conflict in the DRC, and listed examples for some of the drivers that illustrate the drivers' actual or hypothetical relevance to the three types of conflict in the DRC.

- Self-interested leaders operating in a culture of impunity are able to mobilize disgruntled groups seeking retribution without recourse to a functioning justice system.
 - i. *Potential violent conflict simmering*: An opposition political party leader motivates the youth to go after the government because several youth were attacked while campaigning for the opposition or because they were not able to register.
 - ii. *Post-conflict*: The local Minister of Planning goes on the radio in Katanga with hate speech (providing testimony as being a victim) to incite the people in his community to attack another ethnic group to protest the lack of justice in redistribution of land.

- iii. *Hot-spot*: An armed combatant who uses rape as a tactic of war within an environment of conflict and impunity encourages other combatants to commit rape as a tactic of war, further deteriorating the social fabric of the community and destabilizing the region.
- Self-interested leaders operating in a context of a lack of economic opportunities (including livelihoods and food security) are able to mobilize disgruntled groups seeking redress for unequal distribution of such opportunities.
 - i. *Potential violent conflict simmering*: Shrinking access to resources could cause ethnic conflict within the group of artisanal miners. As mining land becomes increasingly scarce, Katangans could turn on Kassaiaans to try to push them out to decrease the Katangan rate of loss of access to land. Should access continue to decline, conflict would no longer be primarily along ethnic lines, as Katangans would also battle other Katangans.
 - ii. *Post-conflict*: In Kisangani, ex-combatants remobilize because they have no other jobs. The ex-commander of a militia has not been able to find a credible livelihood, so he encourages demobilized youth to mobilize to set up roadblocks or to demand jobs.
 - iii. *Hot-spot*: Armed groups with little access to economic opportunity organize trafficking in slaves to run illegal commodities extraction.
- Self-interested leaders, operating in a context of a lack of provision of social services and the lack of signs of positive change to come during the current temporary window of opportunity for the government to prove itself, are able to mobilize disgruntled groups to march on government representatives or exit from the system through returning to authoritarianism or balkanization.
 - i. *Potential violent conflict simmering*: Katanga will try to secede in practice or officially. People will revert to living in the bush, with no contact with the center.
 - ii. *Post-conflict*: A power vacuum in areas would lead to annexation by neighboring countries.
 - iii. *Hot-spot*: The central government having failed, an opportunistic leader will step in through violent conflict.
- A self-interested leader operating in a culture of ethnic polarization (indigenism) is able to mobilize a vulnerable group upset by perceived wrongs to their group to seek to remove one or more other groups from their region.
- People seeking to protect their perceived rights to land or mineral concessions come together to fight other claimants in violent conflict.
- Victims form armed groups such as Mai-Mai militias in response to predatory actions by the military and police.
- External actors operating in the highly corrupt and weak state of the DRC mobilize self-interested parties to create conditions of instability to allow exploitation of Congolese resources.

Mitigating Factors

Key actors may mobilize groups around the potential of social and institutional resilience to actively mitigate against the eruption of violent conflict. The Team identified both actual mitigating factors currently affecting the DRC, and also noted potential mitigating factors that realistically could be mobilized or further strengthened in the future.

Primary Factors Currently Mitigating Conflict

- A rare positive and charismatic leader operating in the environment of a failed state is able to mobilize groups to operate together for common interest in peace. Example: A famous musician, within the wake of intercommunal violence, mobilizes youth around their responsibility to promote community reconciliation.
- A leader is able to utilize a sense of Congolese identity to urge participation in the peace plan among competing identity groups in Kivus.
- International investors, acting in their own interests, may take steps to help mitigate conflict.
- Non-state actors provide social services to the majority of people who receive services, providing short-term mitigation against conflict by meeting some needs. Long-term, this may be de-stabilizing as the government may or may not step up to taking these responsibilities.
- MONUC in the short term provides a mitigating factor, but in the long-term it may be destabilizing.
- The international community mediates and supports implementation of peace agreements.

Potential Mitigating Factors that May be Further Mobilized in the Future

- The strong Congolese diaspora may be further engaged in support of peace and development.
- The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) may become more important in mitigating conflict as more of this industry moves into the formal sector.
- Music provides a common culture in the Congo and may be mobilized to support peace.
- The more women are empowered and secure (economically, physically, socially, politically), the more they will be able to mobilize society for the reconstruction of the social fabric.

Moments for Increasing or Decreasing the Potential for Conflict

The Team identified several upcoming moments that could be turning points for increasing or decreasing the potential for violent conflict. These are moments that might rapidly change the balance of power, the saliency of core grievances, the strength of conflict mitigating factors, or the political space in which key actors might mobilize drivers of conflict. A key moment will be the lead up to the 2011 elections, which may

emerge as a referendum on the new system. Also important will be a series of steps expected in the ongoing transition and the various influences of outsiders on the DRC.

One of the primary moments for either increasing or decreasing the potential for conflict is the apparent “window of opportunity” Congolese society is affording the transition period. There is an apparent willingness to patiently wait while the new constitution and new government have a chance to begin functioning. There do not seem to be expectations of immediate improvement in government services, standards of living, security, transparency, or justice. However, it is not clear when this window of opportunity will close. The Team concluded that the 2011 Presidential and Parliamentary elections will likely offer the country an opportunity to consider the success—or failure—of the transition. When in the run up to those elections might Congolese become exasperated with a lack of improvement? The potential for conflict will drastically increase when people lose their patience with the transition, but the potential for conflict will strongly decrease if the government is able to show significant improvements before people lose their patience. The Team suggested that the next two and a half years are the most critical for the government to show results prior to the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2011.

Other expected developments offer opportunities for either decreasing or increasing the likelihood of conflict, depending on how well these developments are handled. Local elections in 2009 do not seem thus far to have raised high expectations, but could become a mobilizing event if expectations increase. Local elections could also exacerbate tensions and potentially ignite conflict within already divided communities. Ongoing administrative reforms involved in decentralization and redrawing the provincial boundaries in the next year or so will no doubt spark some conflict, but it could be channeled into nonviolent means provided the judicial and legislative institutions are prepared to address the issues surrounding these transitions appropriately. Likewise, renegotiation of mineral concessions and implementation of the 60-40% revenue sharing scheme will likely spark controversy, but transparent governance structures could address these concerns and avoid violence.

The actions of others outside the DRC will influence the likelihood of violent conflict there. Implementation of the Amani Accord, Nairobi Agreement, and efforts to reign in the LRA depend on the constructive participation of many actors, and will affect the DRC negatively if significant obstacles prevent continued peace building. The expected MONUC drawdown in the next five years will have to be handled with extreme care and attention to replacing the functions that have been filled by MONUC.

Priorities for Engaging to Prevent Widespread Violent Conflict

The Team concluded that addressing impunity and the lack of security are important in the next two and a half years and beyond, and are strongly connected to other priority areas. Specifically, the following priorities should inform the United States in its efforts to build peace and support development in the DRC.

- ***Throughout the country, all USG engagement should be conflict sensitive at all three levels (potential conflict simmering, post-conflict, and hot spot) and to interaction between the levels.*** In the context of the conflict dynamics in Congo, the interagency ICAF Team identified the following key threats and concluded that all of these are strongly affected by the need to ***build security and address impunity*** throughout the country:
 - Vulnerability of the population on a massive scale and their increasing anger in the absence of physical security against widespread predatory behavior of legal and illegal armed groups, military, and police;
 - Willingness to seek violent retribution in the context of impunity and lawlessness;
 - Desperation due to a lack of economic opportunities (livelihoods, food security);
 - Violence between competing claimants in the context of unclear/un-enforced land tenure and resource rights
 - Frustration with extremely limited provision of services and a lack of government presence;
 - *Autochtonie* and ethnic polarization are easily mobilized to engage in violence; and
 - External actors' support of instability to exploit Congolese resources.

- If supported, the following key factors of Congolese resilience could mitigate conflict and instability, while ***positive Congolese leadership and inclusion of women*** cut across these factors:
 - Existence of a small cadre of positive Congolese leadership;
 - Women's empowerment, improved security and opportunities for leadership;
 - Corporate social responsibility among international investors for the benefit of the local people;
 - A sense of national Congolese identity for promotion of peace;
 - Peaceful non-state actors providing social services for the near-term benefit of the people;
 - MONUC's provision of a relatively temporary level of stability in the non-functioning state; and
 - USG leadership and collaboration with the international community in supporting peace agreements and ensuring appropriate resources for implementation.

The team's analysis suggests that all US programming in the DRC should be explicitly linked to conflict programming. Specific initiatives in the DRC should not usually be targeted only in the Kivus, but also piloted in other regions in order to ensure broader development and peacebuilding while also reducing inequality of access to international support as a potential core grievance.

Potential Consequences of Failure to Act

The Team assessed the potential consequences of a failure to act as grave. Rather than seeing the active conflict in the Kivus as a last remaining hot spot in a country where other areas had cooled off, the Team saw the active conflict in the Kivus as a symptom of

the underlying conflict drivers present throughout the country. While the Kivus currently differ from other regions due to the level of involvement of external actors, history tells us that other regions are not immune to such interventions. As the Zairian state disintegrated, outside actors moved in to fill the vacuum.

With this analysis, the Team concluded that the Kivus must be a focus but not to the exclusion of other regions that are also very vulnerable to conflict. A failure to intervene in these priority areas in the DRC would not only leave the current conflict in North Kivu unaddressed, but would also open the rest of the country to possible widespread violence over time. As patience with the transition wears thin in the coming years, wider violence will become more and more likely. The more such violence spreads, the closer Congo's very weak state will come to its breaking point. The Congolese people and their many neighbors do not need another failed state in the heart of Africa. Thus, the Team concluded the next two and a half years present an important opportunity for significant investment in peace and development in the DRC.

Appendix 1: Summary Presented to “F” Assistance Working Group, June 30, 2008

The DRC is an extremely complex operating environment with a wide range of challenges to peace and development. There is an absence of basic infrastructure and reliable communication in the vast majority of the country. A culture of systemic corruption, patron-client systems and chronically weak institutions enable destabilizing “winner take all” outcomes across sectors. Given its large quantities of valuable natural resources and strategic location

bordering nine countries, stability in the DRC is critical for stability in the region. The valuable resources in DRC remain both a motivation for conflict and a means by which conflict is waged.

➤ ***Conflicts in the DRC exist on three primary levels:***

- The “hot spots” of active violent conflict (e.g. North Kivu)
- The post-conflict areas that have emerged from active violent conflict but are vulnerable to an immediate return to violence (e.g. Ituri)
- Potential violent conflict simmering throughout the Congo (e.g. Bas Congo)

➤ ***Throughout the country, all USG engagement should be conflict sensitive at all three levels and to interaction between the levels.*** In the context of the conflict dynamics in Congo, the interagency ICAF team identified the following key threats and concluded that all of these are strongly affected by the need to ***build security and address impunity*** throughout the country:

- Vulnerability of the population on a massive scale and their increasing anger in the absence of physical security against widespread predatory behavior of armed groups, military, and police;
- Willingness to seek violent retribution in the context of impunity and lawlessness;
- Desperation due to a lack of economic opportunities (livelihoods, food security);
- Violence between competing claimants in the context of unclear/un-enforced land tenure and resource rights
- Frustration with extremely limited provision of services and a lack of government presence;
- *Autochtonie* and ethnic polarization are easily mobilized to engage in violence; and
- External actors’ support of instability to exploit Congolese resources.

➤ If supported, the following key factors of Congolese resilience could mitigate conflict and instability, ***positive Congolese leadership and inclusion of women*** cut across these factors:

- Existence of a small cadre of positive Congolese leadership;
- Women’s empowerment, improved security and opportunities for leadership;
- Corporate social responsibility among international investors for the benefit of the local people;
- A sense of national Congolese identity for promotion of peace;
- Peaceful non-state actors providing social services for the near-term benefit of the people;
- MONUC’s provision of a relatively temporary level of stability in the non-functioning state; and
- USG leadership and collaboration with the international community in supporting peace agreements and ensuring appropriate resources for implementation.

Strategic Priorities for USG engagement in DRC:

- **Ensure sensitivity to conflict dynamics in all USG efforts throughout country**
- **Address critical threats to stability of insecurity and impunity**
- **Bolster indigenous sources of social and institutional resilience**

Appendix 2: ICAF Workshop Worksheets Produced by Team

Context	Identity Groups	Societal Patterns	Institutional Performance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large size of the country creates cost and logistical challenges for service delivery • Poor infrastructure • Corruption • Inequitable access to resources • History of oppression and political repression by Belgian colonial authorities and Mobutu has resulted in passivity among Congolese. Few think beyond the present/immediate as a result of the conflict which means that people do not think about the longer term good. • Culture of resource grabbing results in people thinking only in short term time horizons. • Lack of access to information. No television; radio is the primary form of media. • Legacy of year to year (not longer term) donor planning (e.g. USAID has been operating on one-year plans in DRC for years). • State governance systems are not formalized • Impact of various conflicts, including regional conflicts often thought of as Africa's first World War which is still seen in the conflict in the Kivus. Concern that giving too much attention to the Kivis will negatively impact the situation in the rest of the country • Lack of state representation with donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rwanda phone groups (Banyamulenge, other Congolese Tutsis) • Regional Groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Kasais ○ Katanga ○ Bas-Congo → local challenge to state authority ○ Kivus ○ Equateur— Mobutists • Ethnic groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ baluba, bashi, bafulero ○ Majority of ethnic groups are aligned with political movements <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political parties • Deputies in National Assembly • People who voted for unsuccessful party (they now receive diminished services) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overarching pattern <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Patron/Client • People inside DRC have strong allegiances to neighboring countries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ethnic groups inside DRC: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rwanda ▪ Uganda ▪ Burundi • Primary identity malleable/manipulated <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Groups are mobilized around desire to be <i>included</i> in Congolese identity ○ Often determined by need and influential Key Actors <p>⇒ Culture and cycle of exploitation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Linkage with state failure and lack of legitimate fee schemes ○ Present day orientation, short-term thinking <p>⇒ Self Reliance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Subsistence agriculture supports this in terms of mitigating rising food costs <p>⇒ Patronage systems</p> <p>⇒ Transaction costs, which can also act as stabilizers</p> <p>⇒ Demand for maintaining the status quo.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To control chaos, to maintain land tenure systems, out of personal interest and for personal gain. <p>⇒ Legitimacy is borne out of grief and a</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Assembly performing • Most other government not functioning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Justice sector not functioning ○ No judges in most areas

<p>and communities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace dividends are very limited- key beneficiaries to date are politicians and South Kivu • Inadequate access to social services, no access to justice, lack of access to education • Limited civil society, although in the past there was a more vibrant civil society it was and continues to be oriented to service delivery. There are few advocacy type organizations and those that so exist have largely been politicized. • An increasing politicization of ethnicity (post-Mobutu; during the Mobutu years ethnic differences were quashed and a national identity created). There is a national identity that remains post-Mobutu. • A large number of diverse ethnic groups • Erosion of confidence in democracy • Concern over the impact of the creation of new provinces • Accountability gap between elected officials and civilians • Donor dependence (more pronounced in some regions) • Bad neighborhood – conflicts in neighboring countries have spilled over borders • Struggle for identity with multiple ethnic groups • Urbanization • Regional economic linkages primarily in the east 				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional Chiefs 			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Returnees (IDP and refugees) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Those who've been in Rwanda are viewed as suspect ○ Refugees returning versus those that stayed→tensions often over land 		<p>sense of injustice</p> <p>⇒ Manipulation of international community by the government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In distribution of services and security (MONUC) to specific geographical areas. <p>⇒ Perception of MONUC as behaving badly. Also perception of them as ineffective, but expectations may be off here as they are doing the work of the government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Expectations of MONUC leads to grievances <p>⇒ Congolese citizens are unaware of the value of their country's natural resources</p> <p>⇒ Economic driver for resources</p> <p>⇒ Perceived donor favoritism</p> <p>⇒ Insecurity</p> <p>⇒ Corruption</p> <p>⇒ Civil Passivity (??) (<i>the question marks were on the sheet and not sure what they indicate</i>)</p> <p>⇒ Impunity</p> <p>⇒ Poor social conditions</p> <p>⇒ Banditry/Lawlessness</p> <p>⇒ Competition for resources</p> <p>⇒ Peace dividends</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Those who have decided to demobilize. ○ S. Kivu has seen peace dividends ○ Senior government officials have a new access to resources <p>⇒ Functioning of government services</p> <p>⇒ Community participation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural resource capture
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host communities • Military groups • Ex-combatants • Military groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ FDLR ○ CNDP ○ Mayi-Mayi ○ Ugandan ○ Rwandan 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unpaid military • Security forces dysfunctional
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONUC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provides security infrastructure 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONUC - UN mission for security infrastructure drawing down
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socio-economic groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ E.g. All money goes to Kivu, but problems there not different from rest of country 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic disillusionment—Kivus
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious groups 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The east has better infrastructure and is better connected internally and regionally • East-West divide in the last election • Exploitable resources: west has lumber and east has minerals • Bas Congo region – violent conflict challenges the governments ability to deliver services • Service delivery occurs primarily through CSO. For example churches maintain primary hospitals and before cell phones also provided communication networks • Some groups that really had little influence or legitimacy came to the table during peace talks to gain legitimacy. • Formal and traditional structures are parallel • Large IDP and refugee populations. Many returnees in the Kivus and Katanga; returns exacerbate land tenure issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Church • Advocacy-based NGO's <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Funded by donors and compete for elected positions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Land tenure reforms ⇒ Set-up of 4 Vice Presidents plus 1 President (4 + 1) ⇒ Decades of repression ⇒ Politicization and manipulation of ethnicity ⇒ Religious groups provide many social services ⇒ Demobilization ⇒ Large numbers of IDPs and refugees <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Refugee return often contentious because they left and because of tensions regarding land access ⇒ Desire among population to be included (not secessionist) ⇒ Land tenure reform 	<p>groups provide services (85% of schools provided by Church)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil society - provides social services (fills gaps because the government doesn't provide these services) • Health and education services are provided but inconsistently
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US Embassies in Rwanda and DRC see the DRC-Rwanda relationship differently. • Proliferation of small arms • Peace talks in Goma in early 2008 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ East/west ○ Cities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Kabila identified with East ○ Kinois—people from Kinshasa→animosity towards Kivus 	<p>Gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Inequality ⇒ SGBV laws have been developed, avenue to power for some, civil society has mobilized around the issue ⇒ Self-interest can trump group interests ⇒ Empowerment ⇒ Large numbers of children for woman ⇒ Roles determine the ability of women to be involved in various activities or forums 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business Sector • Aristanal miners • Trade unions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Demand for services ⇒ Mobilization of highly educated youth/university graduates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Seek positions of authority, 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International community 	<p>but demand exceeds supply. Fear over limited access to work opportunities.</p> <p>Geography</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Perception that opportunities exist only in Kinshasa ⇒ East is more internally connected and connected with neighbors, whereas west is less connected either internally or externally ⇒ East – West divide and political divide ⇒ Economic links across borders (Uganda, Rwanda, etc) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International community - poor coordination , few large scale projects are undertaken
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Social/Institutional Resiliences	Core Grievances
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National expectation/believe that health and education are important and services that should be provided. [Historically provided by Belgians and now churches and civic society and foreign donors.] • Widespread provision of social services by church groups and civil society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Across DRC, majority feel that democracy has not provided core social services. • Refugees desiring to return to N. Kivu are afraid for physical security and residents of N. Kivu do not feel secure. • Katanga residents are concerned about lack of social services—health care and education. • Mayi-Mayi protected themselves against “Rwandans” because of lack of access to land and resources and lack of judicial recourse. • General core grievance for majority in East is lack of access to land, resources and lack of judicial recourse. • IDP’s want right to vote and official recognition of citizenship.

Key Actors	Motivations	Means
Formal Government		
State (DRC)	Resource Capture	Power, Money
4 Vice Presidents		
Fonctionnaires		Working level Organizers, Connection to Community, Agent for Change
Sub-province Gov't Leaders		Appointed Now, but in the future will be elected
Governors	Resources	Power, Money
Ministry of Interior	Centralize Local Authority	
National Assembly	Decentralize local authority; represent local interests at national level	Elected
Provincial Assembly	Represent local interests a provincial level (report to governor)	Elected
Provincial Ministries	Represent head of patron/client system	
Judiciary Branch		
Police		
Army (Local Brigade Commanders) (18 Brigades)	Unpaid	
Rebel Groups		
Nkunda (Kivus)		Mobilize forces (Predominately Tutsis)
Kabali???		
FDLR		
Other		
Church (Religion)	Organizational Capacity and able to stir-up ethnic tension	
Mobutu (Historically)	Control	Established Patron/Client System
Media Radio (UN Station)	Political Motivation	Community Based Radio
Opportunistic Actors	Profit/Resources	Seize Opportunities as they arise
Civil Society	Funding, Altruism	Provide Services (Advocacy)
Artisanal Miners		Income, profit, wealth
Negociants		
Commercants	Profit	Transportation Capabilities
Women		
People with Guns	Food for survival, Militia membership, Mercenaries,	Use of Guns

	(Kivus)	
Patrons (Mostly at local level)	Power, Profit	Provide services to clients and ability to tax
<i>International Actors</i>		Focused on Kivus
S. Africa	Commercial Interests, Private Sector	USG Support, Train Military
UNOHCHR	Map Human Rights Violations	UN Mandate
MONUC	UN Mandate	Money from UN
Donors	Timelines, Funding	Money, Resource
China (Gov't Prvt Enterprise)	Resources, Profit	Money, resources
Angola, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda	Regional Stability, Access to resources, Congolese Refugees in these Countries	Diplomacy, (Military)
Companies who Supply Western Consumers (Foreign/US)	Profits through Exploitation	
<i>**Note: Lack of Predictable Actors that form the National/Local Structure indicates the weakness of power structures and void of leadership**</i>		

DRC ICAF-- Summary of Findings Through Day 2

Three types of conflict of concern in Congo:

- The “hot spot” of active violent conflict in Kivu
- The post-conflict areas that have emerged from active violent conflict
- Potential violent conflict simmering in the entire rest of Congo, which suffers from structural violence and widespread vulnerability.

Primary Drivers of Conflict

- **Self-interested leaders operate in a culture of impunity able to mobilize disgruntled groups seeking retribution outside formal justice system.**
 - i. *Potential violent conflict simmering:* An opposition political party leader motivates the youth to go after the government because several youth were attacked while campaigning for the opposition or because they were not able to register.
 - ii. *Post-conflict:* The local Minister of Planning goes on the radio in Katanga with hate speech (providing testimony as being a victim) to incite the people in his community to attack another ethnic group to protest the lack of justice in redistribution of land.
 - iii. *Hot-spot:* An armed combatant who uses rape as a tactic of war within an environment of conflict and impunity encourages other combatants to commit rape, further deteriorating the social fabric of the community and destabilizing the region.
- **Self-interested leaders operating in a context of a lack of economic opportunities (including livelihoods and food security) are able to mobilize disgruntled groups seeking redress for unequal distribution of such opportunities.**
 - i. *Potential violent conflict simmering:* Shrinking access to resources causes ethnic conflict within the group of artisanal miners. As mineable land becomes increasingly scarce, Katangans turn on Kassians to try to push them out to decrease the Katangan rate of loss of easily mineable land.
 - ii. *Post-conflict:* In Kisangani, ex-combatants remobilize because they have no other jobs. The ex-commander of a militia has not been able to find a credible livelihood, so he encourages demobilized youth to mobilize to set up roadblocks or to demand jobs.
 - iii. *Hot-spot:* Armed groups with little access to economic opportunity organize trafficking in slaves to run illegal commodities extraction.
- **Self-interested leaders, operating in a context of a lack of provision of social services and the lack of signs of positive change to come during the current temporary window of opportunity for the government to prove itself, are able to mobilize disgruntled groups to march on government representatives or exit from the system through returning to authoritarianism or balkanization.**

- i. *Potential violent conflict simmering*: Katanga will try to secede in practice or else officially. People will revert to living in the bush, with no contact with the center.
 - ii. *Post-conflict*: A power vacuum in areas would lead to annexation by neighboring countries.
 - iii. *Hot-spot*: The central government having failed, an opportunistic leader will step in through violent conflict.
- **A self-interested leader operates in a culture of ethnic polarization (indigenouness) and is able to mobilize a vulnerable group upset by perceived wrongs to their group to seek to remove one or more other groups from their region.**
 - **People seeking to protect their perceived rights to land or mineral concessions come together to fight other claimants in violent conflict.**
 - **Victims will form armed groups such as Mai Mai militias in response to predatory actions by the military and police.**

Primary Factors Mitigating Conflict

- **A rare positive and charismatic leader operating in the environment of a failed state is able to mobilize groups to operate together for common interest in peace.** Example: A famous musician, within the wake of intercommunal violence, mobilizes youth around their responsibility to promote community reconciliation.
- **A leader is able to utilize a sense of Congolese identity to urge participation in peace plan among competing identity groups in Kivus.**
- **International investors, acting in their own interests, may take steps to help mitigate conflict.**
- **Aggrieved groups are unable to spread conflict due to a lack of infrastructure and or information.** (This is also a dynamic that allows the violent conflict to continue—rebel groups are hiding in the bush.) Some members of the group strongly disagree that this is a mitigating factor, citing that lack of access to information does not mitigate conflict.
- **Non-state actors provide social services to the majority of people who receive services, providing short-term mitigation against conflict by meeting some needs. Long-term, this may be de-stabilizing as the government may or may not step up to taking these responsibilities.**
- **MONUC in the short term provides a mitigating factor, but in the long-term it may be destabilizing. Some short-term mitigating factors will be destabilizing if they stick around too long.**

Potential Mitigating Factors that May be Further Mobilized in the Future

- The strong Congolese diaspora may be further engaged in support of peace and development.
- The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative may become more important in mitigating conflict as more of this industry moves into the formal sector.
- Music provides a common culture in the Congo and may be mobilized to support peace.

Appendix 3: Participants

This report attempts to summarize the conclusions of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (ICAT) that met June 24-26, 2008. The following members of the ICAT were not all in attendance consistently at each session, and thus may not have agreed with some of the conclusions expressed in this report. In addition, please note that the ICAT has not reviewed this report for accuracy.

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